The WPA began as an informal alumni society for the Department of Philosophy at the University of Windsor. Shortly after the inception of the WPA it became a loose knit association of alumni from the department of philosophy, philosophers located in Windsor, and generally friends of philosophy within the region. This more general association was intended to be an open group that supports the development of a critical community of the philosophically minded within the region. The WPA supported both student and independent scholarship and encourages philosophers to bring their research beyond the bounds of the university and into the public sphere.
In May of 2013, the WPA transformed again into the WP(A)A, a registered Non-Profit Corporation and Charitable Organization in Ontario. The notion behind this latest transformation is to establish a non-profit artist organization (akin to Artcite, Windsor) dedicated to supporting independent philosophical scholarship and philosophers intervention events within the greater Windsor region.

Wednesday, January 26, 2011


Philosophy DRY RUN Series
Dr. Jeff Noonan
The Life-Value of Death

In his seminal reflection on the badness of death, Nagel links it to the permanent loss “of whatever good there is in living.”  I will argue, following McMurtry, that “whatever good there is in living” is defined by the life-value of resources, institutions, experiences, and activities.  Enjoyed expressions of the human capacities to experience the world, to form relationships, and to act as creative agents are (with important qualifications) intrinsically life-valuable, the reason why anyone would desire to go on living indefinitely.  As Nagel argues, “the fact that we will eventually die in a few score years cannot by itself imply that it would not be good to live longer.  If there is no limit to the amount of life that it would be good to have, then it may be that a bad end is in store for all of us.” In this paper I want to question whether in fact there is no limit to the amount of life it would be good to have.  My general conclusion will be that it is not the case that the eternal or even indefinite prolongation of any particular individual life necessarily increases life-value.  Perhaps more controversially, I will claim that there are at least four ways in which death has actual life-value.  Were death thus somehow removed as an inescapable limiting frame on human life, overall reductions of life-value would be the consequence. Individual and collective life would lose those forms of moral and material life-value that form the bases of life’s being meaningful and purposive. 
Wednesday, February 2, 2011
4:00 p.m.
Rose Room, Vanier Hall, University of Windsor
Admission is free.  All are welcome to attend.

1 comment:

  1. The point I also tried, but failed, to make, half drunkenly, at the Philosophy and Fear colloquium. Savater outlines the existentialist version of this position very nicely in The Questions of Life (1999).